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Picking up on what Larry Ross said, we are coming up almost on the first anniversary of
the President's speech (Figure 1) committing us to finishing space station, going back to
the moon and then going on to Mars, and he has repeated that on a number of occasions
over the past year, and the money was put in the fiscal 1991 budget to work on the
Space Exploration Initiative.
Specifically, the President requested $179.4 million for exploration technology, and of
that, $11 million was earmarked for nuclear propulsion, subdivided into $10 million for
nuclear thermal and $1 million for nuclear electric propulsion. There was flexibility put
in that we could do studies on either concept under the 10 million.
And the President, again in the speech that he gave last July (Figure 2) spoke of
finishing Space Station, going back to the Moon and then the mission to Mars; that's
really the focus of our exploration technology program: the return to the Moon and then
going to Mars.
In one of the meetings that I attended with Frank Martin, who was head of the Office of
Exploration before it was merged with the old Office of Aeronautics and Space
Technology, Frank said he did not necessarily need nuclear propulsion to go to the
Moon but he certainly felt it was almost enabling to go to Mars.
The President in a number of speeches has talked about going to Mars within the
lifetime of the scientists and engineers (Figure 3) who are going to be brought onboard
to work the program and also to have people on Mars by the time of the 50th --
anniversary of the Apollo 11 landing which says that we have to be there by 2019. Now,
in February (Figure 4) he approved policy for the Space Exploration Initiative and he
said that is going to include both lunar and Mars elements as well as robotic missions.
He said the near-term focus is going to be on technology development. And you may be
aware that we have an Outreach Program, which General Tom Stafford is heading, and
which is in response to the Vice-President's request that NASA cast a wide net looking
for innovative ideas. There will be meetings and so forth coming up on that. In fact,
NASA and the AIAA are sponsoring a meeting in the first full week of September to
look at some of the technology items for the Space Exploration Initiative. There is going
to be a focus on high leverage innovative technologies and certainly I think nuclear
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propulsion, both NTP and NEP, are part of that.
Now, it is probably going to take severalyears to come up with the mission architectures
for how we go back to the moon and go on to Mars, and that requires us to maintain a
certain amount of flexibility. I think in the nuclear propulsion program we have to be
able to adapt to whatever comesout of thesestudies and we havegot to be able to
provide the planners with the information they will need.
NASA is going to be the principal implementing agency,but we are going to be working
with the Defense Department and the Department of Energy. Certainly, when we get
into nuclear propulsion we recognize the capabilities of the DOE laboratories, and we
have been advertising the current workshops as joint NASA/DOD/DOE meetings. And
I am glad to see the attendance from those agencies here.
Last November, the President approved our current version of the national space policy,
which updated the policy that was in effect during the Reagan administration (Figure 5).
One of the key points in that was that our goal is expanding human presence and activity
beyond Earth orbit and out into the solar system. There is a background on this policy
that's been developing over several years, dating back to 1986 when the Congressionally-
mandated National Commission on Space issued its report on "Pioneering the Space
Frontier" and in this report there is discussion of nuclear propulsion. And then Dr. Sally
Ride issued a report to the NASA administrator in 1987 and that laid out about four
mission scenarios including going to Mars. Of course, one of her recommendations was
that NASA create an Office of Exploration, which NASA did, and that office issued the
first of a series of annual reports in 1988, also looking at the Mars mission.
There are a number of reasons why we should go to Mars, (Figure 6) and certainly
technology and education are key parts of it because we need something, at least in my
view, that inspires people to go into science and engineering. My personal view is we
have enough lawyers; we need people who are going to go out there and give us the
technology edge because, as all the commentators are pointing out, the battle in the
early 21st century is not going to be military, it is going to be economic. Certainly,
continuing our journey into space and to Mars gives us the chance to understand
planetary evolution. Perhaps the most fascinating thing concerns life on Mars, ifit ever
got a chance to start, and if not, why not. So again, that's our long-range goal and that's
our focus on the nuclear propulsion program that we are developing.
Now, during the last year following the President's July 20th speech, NASA set up an
in-house group which did the "90 day study," and that study looked at going to Mars and
identified a number of key technologies (Figure 7) that are needed for human
exploration of the moon and Mars and nuclear propulsion was one of those key
technologies. So that was the first highlight on it.
Then in response to that, we put together within OAET, now the Office of Aeronautics
4
Exploration and Technology,an Exploration Technology Program which is to develop a
broad set of technologies(Figure 8) to enable future decisionson development of future
spaceexploration missions.
The Exploration TechnologyProgram is not a sandbox,it is to be a critically needed
focusedtechnology program and it includes these technology areas, And again, one of
them is nuclear propulsion. And the explorative technology program is the one that was
budgeted at $179.4Min the President'ssubmittal for FY91.
Now, specifically for nuclear propulsion theseare the words that went into our internal
budget documents(Figure 9). And we said that the technology that will be developed
under nuclear propulsion is to addressmultiple approaches(Figure 10) for applying
spacenuclear power systemsto the improvement of nuclear performance for human
missionsto Mars. We said we would start work on a nuclear thermal rocket propulsion
technology and at the time we said solid core and gascore systemswould be looked at.
And later I will mention also liquid core conceptsand all of theseconceptswere to be
consideredfor future piloted missionsto Mars. We also said we would be working on
nuclear electric propulsion technologiesand that would include both the reactor and the
electric propulsion system.
For those of you who have followed this, we had a previous program called Pathfinder
which is the precursor, if you will, for the Exploration Technology Program. We did
have an element in the pathfinder program called Cargo Vehicle Propulsion which
unfortunately wasnot funded. That was focusedstrictly on the electric propulsion
thrusters. Now, under NEP, we have the reactor plus the electric thrusters and we also
have nuclear thermal propulsion. So when we talk nuclear propulsion it consistsof two
key elements,and we have put together a draft thrust plan, as we call it, for all of
nuclear propulsion and that is a draft document coming out of Headquarters.
We have set up various roles on this. Lewis Research Center here in Cleveland is our
lead center within the NASA complex on working nuclear propulsion. And they are
helping us pull this whole activity together. In nuclear thermal proptllsion, they are being
assisted very ably from the people from Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville,
Alabama, and in nuclear electric propulsion they are being assisted by JPL, Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, in Pasadena.
At this point I should thank a whole lot of you because you are going to see charts up
here from the various NASA centers and DOE laboratories and contractors. Bob
Frisbee at JPL frequently reminds me the difference between plagiarism and scholarship
is whether or not you acknowledge the sources, so I want to acknowledge a lot of you on
this. Now under nuclear thermal propulsion (Figure 11), we are going to be looking at
the whole system, the reactor, shielding, pumps, and all of that.
Larry Ross mentioned, in his opening remarks, the previous work done at Lewis
managingthe NERVA program and other activities. I think that there is a synergism
betweenchemical propulsion activities and nuclearpropulsion activities, and this is a
messageI have gotten in talking to people at Lewis and Marshall. The
ROVER/NERVA program in manyways led the country in the 1960son cryogenic
technology,but the chemical people with the SpaceShuttle main enginesand so forth
have sincegone beyond; there are things that we can learn from them.
One thing I would like to do is not get into a chemical versus nuclear mode; rather I
would like to adopt a view that nuclear is simply an extension of chemical. We are going
to take the chemical technology for pumps and nozzles and so forth and just heat the
propellant in a different way.
Within our thrust plan, we have a number of goals (Figure 12). These include
developing the technologies to apply space nuclear power to improve the performance
for human missions to Mars. Our focus is really on the piloted missions, find out of this
we want to come up with at least one concept that alone or in combination with other
systems can meet the requirements for piloted and cargo missions to Mars.
Now, in combination it could be something like nuclear thermal propulsion plus nuclear
electric propulsion, the hybrid concept. I think there is at least one talk on that
scheduled during this workshop. It also might end up being chemical plus nuclear. There
are various ways perhaps to do it. Our objectives (Figure 13) include developing safe
advanced nuclear propulsion systems that are responsive to the Space Exploration
Initiative requirements, and we have to have a focus on safety.
Right now NASA has a court case pending on the Ulysses mission, which is a European
Space Agency spacecraft that NASA is launching this fall, and which has one
radioisotope thermoelectric generator. We have been taken to court to stop that launch.
We have also been asked to not allow Galileo to fly by the Earth in December, and we
may get the judge's ruling this week. We have to be ever mindful of safety whenever we
get into this nuclear arena. As the cliche goes we have to be squeaky clean. In fact, as
one fellow said, if out of all of these workshops one piece of paper finds its way into the
gutter and somebody comes by and picks it up, that piece of paper had better have the
word safety on it.
We are going to look at component subsystems and systems technology, and what we
want is to come out with a validated base for moving on in nuclear propulsion. There
are project level goals (Figure 14 & 15) and Lewis has taken the lead and will be
working with Marshall and JPL in coming up with project plans on nuclear thermal
propulsion and nuclear electric propulsion.
Now, there is a bit of a strategy behind this I would like to spend a few minutes on. In
putting all of this together, again our focus has been on safety, reliability and high
performance technology. As to reliability, we are of course, aware of the problems on
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Hubble and other things and so this is going to be a challenge for the people working
the panel on advanced planning. How do we test a nuclear propulsion system? That's
going to be something we are really going to have to wrestle with, and certainly there are
strong arguments for all-up testing on the ground if we can do it.
We certainly need to work with the public, with Congress, and the administration on
developing a consensus on the safe use of nuclear propulsion, because now we are doing
something a little different from say a Galileo or Ulysses, where the device is just sent
out. We are talking about sending people out a nuclear system and bringing them back
into, perhaps, a low Earth orbit. And in fact, there is a meeting scheduled today in the
Pentagon to wrestle with the question of the effects of gamma rays and other particle
emissions from reactors on scientific satellites. Congress mandated that the Defense
Department would provide a report on how reactors in space might affect science
satellites such as the Gamma Ray Observatory and so forth. We are going to have to be
sensitive to that with nuclear propulsion.
Out of our work we have got a chance to strengthen and extend the propulsion
technology foundation for the civil space program. Again I want to emphasize we are
just taking chemical another step further. A key part of this effort has to be involving
the universities, because that's where the people are coming from who are going to carry
these programs into the 21st century. Also, the program really needs to be done with
other agencies such as the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense; their labs
and their contractors have expertise that we don't have at NASA, and I think this
maximizes the use of existing resources. And obviously, in this country, if you do
something it really ends up being done by industry and by laboratories. So it's got to be
done as a team approach involving industry and the universities and laboratories.
Again, to emphasize, this is to be a phased and focused technology development
program. We have been asked throughout the Exploration Technology Program to set
up "wickets" through which these various ideas have to flow and we are going to have to
make decisions as we go along. We cannot continue to work nuclear propulsion or we
cannot work our life support or artificial intelligence or whatever indefinitely. We have
to be focused on where we are going with them.
The last issue is maintaining a flexible design approach. If you go back and look at the
ROVER/NERVA program, it started out when the Air Force went to the Atomic
Energy Commission looking for a way to have an ICBM, and they wanted a nuclear
rocket ICBM. Then, when NASA was created, it became a vehicle for going to Mars.
Next it became a tug to go from low Earth orbit to lunar orbit; so that's part of the
reason you see a multiplicity of nuclear thermal propulsion designs in the late 1950s and
1960s. The requirements keep changing, so we have to be flexible; but as a colleague of
mine once said, "we have to be flexible but not limp."
There are a couple of things on "why nuclear propulsion" that are coming out of studies
7
that Lewis and Marshall and others have done. If you look at an all-propulsion chemical
system,the initial massrequirement in the low earth orbit is pretty humongous(Figure
16). Once you go down into an aerobrake systemor a nuclear thermal rocket either at
900 to a 1000secondsIsp and even nuclear thermal rocket with aerobrake, they all
significantly improved (Figure 17).
And I might mention that we have had some discussionson what we need to know and I
will start by sayingwhen nuclear is compared againstchemical plus aerobrake, the
aerobrake massfraction used is quite often an optimistic assumptionof 13 to 15percent
or something like that, so that needsto be noted. Thesehave been the typical measures
of performance, but there are people in Headquarters who have askedme a different
question, not so much about the required massin the low Earth orbit but about the trip
time. In this particular study (Figure 18), for example, the electric propulsion systems
were of the order of 650 days,although with somesort of a boost either from nuclear
thermal or chemical they can get that down to a time comparablewith nuclear thermal.
During the 90 day study there was a lot of interest in nuclear gascores (Figure 19),
simply becauseof short trip times, and there are people out there who believe that this is
the major selling point for nuclear propulsion, getting people to Mars quickly so we don't
have excessivelife support issuesto deal with, we don't have to extend the time during
which the astronauts might be exposedto a solar flare, and we minimize the radiation
dose they get from galactic cosmicrays.
This is another chart from Lewis showingplots of relative massin the low Earth orbit as
a function of engine thrust/weight (Figure 20). These havealwayssurprised me, but the
messagethat comesout of these is above about six to ten, thrust-to-weight isn't as
important asspecific impulse. So things to think about asyou go into thesedeliberations
on going to Mars are, short trip times and high specific impulses.
This is a chart that waspresentedat the NEP workshop (Figure 21). Perhapsthere is a
clue here that, if we are willing to relax our massin the low Earth orbit, we can start
pushing for shorter trip times, and perhapsnuclear will get there more quickly than
chemicalplus aerobrake.
As something that I want to leaveyou with, I will quickly mention that these nuclear
propulsion systemscertainly give us versatility (Figure 22). In the ROVER/NERVA
program basic moduleswere developed,and they can be stackedup depending on what
the mission is. Nuclear thermal propulsion and even nuclear electric propulsion offers
the possibility of using in-situ propellants (Figure 23) and Bob Zubrin will be talking
about that later.
In the daysof NERVA, and more recently in other studies,people have looked at using
the reactor not only for direct thermal propulsion (Figure 24), but also to drive a turbine
alternator so you could haveboth power have a nuclear electric propulsion systemas
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well.
The nuclear rocket program asset up in the 1950sand 1960sruns roughly like this
(Figure 25). The point I want to make is that Los Alamos was turned on in about 1955
and the KIWI test started about four years later; this wasbefore the National
Environmental Policy Act and wasa classifiedprogram. Also, Westinghouseand Aerojet
were turned on around 1961,and again it wasseveralyearsbefore we get into the NRX
series.
It's now going to take severalyears to get a ground facility built up and running and tests
going, so we need to be realistic about that. We may be a little optimistic in someof our
salespitches, but I think we ought to not kid ourselves about its taking time to do this.
This just simply shows the evolution of the Los Alamos concepts (Figure 26) and this was
the Aerojet/Westinghouse NERVA (Figure 27) and I won't dwell too much on that.
These (Figure 28) are various ways of running the engine and this breaks out the
individual tests (Figure 29), ending up with the nuclear furnace.
Now, the NERVA/ROVER program had a price tag in 1960 dollars of $1.4 billion; if
you mention those kind of numbers today people get a little nervous; but I have been
told by several people that the cost of developing and qualifying the chemical engine on
the advanced launch system is about $4 billion. The chemical people historically have
thought of at least a billion dollars to qualify a chemical engine, so I don't think we need
to apologize in the nuclear community that we might spend more than a billion dollars
to develop something that is at least twice as good as what we have today. Nor should
we be apologetic about the fact it may take several years to do it.
Even though the ROVER/NERVA program ended about 1972, some people have
continued to work on it. I_as Alamos and INEL looked at small advanced nuclear rocket
engines (Figure 30) and low pressure engines and Brookhaven looked at particle bed
reactor design (Figure 31), which improves heat transfer. And recently I was made
aware of the fact that Brookhaven has looked at a liquid annular reactor system (Figure
32), about which they will talk later, which is a step toward the gas core system and
allows even higher temperatures. Also, of course, work was done under the "
ROVER/NERVA program on gas core systems (Figure 33), wherein you could push the
uranium plasma up to 10,000 degrees Kelvin.
Additionally, there
next few days. On
trip times, because
was a nuclear light-bulb, and we will be hearing about this over the
paper, these advanced concepts certainly offer the possibility of quick
they have the right combination of thrust and Isp.
Now then, what we want to do, given the fact that there are these various concepts both
under solid core and gas core and liquid core (Figure 34) is study them, get into more
detailed designs, do some component testing, with the idea that somewhere toward the
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end of the decade we would come up with a basic nuclear thermal propulsion concept
and similarly, a basic nuclear electric propulsion concept. So, basically, these workshops
are put together as a way to educate those of us who are working on the nuclear thermal
propulsion, and as a quick way to find out where all these concepts are. We do not.
intend to use the workshops to make any sort of selection, however.
Ideally, we would like to carry a number of concepts along in the planning, and for those
of you who were involved in the ROVER/NERVA program, that program did more
than just NERVA and Phoebus and so forth. It also worked on things like gas core and
so forth. So it kept alive even more advanced technologies and I would hope that we
would be able to continue to do that, and that we would not look at any one of these
concepts as the be-all for the rest of the duration of humanity's existence.
There are a lot of issues that we have got to look at (Figure 35). Again, chief among
them will be safety and safeguards plus quality assurance, how we test thege concepts
and what sort of reliability program we come up with. Obviously we are not going to be
able to test dozens of these systems, so we have got to come up with a test program that
will enable us to calculate the reliability and still come up with good reliability. These
are the kinds of issues that we must address in our programs.
The scope that we will be working on (and liquid core should also be in here) (Figure
38), will be going through the different reactor types and how we move the heat around.
Radiation shielding is going to be a key aspect. I might mention that under the
Exploration Technology Program we have a separate program thrust that deals with
shielding. That's being managed by our Materials and Structures Division.
Now, given the fact that back in January the President submitted this budget that
included the $179.4 million for exploration technologies with $11 Million for nuclear
propulsion, what are we going to do, given that we have no money in FY90?
Well, we kicked it around in several meetings (Figure 37 & 38) and decided that we
should at least assemble what we can of the requirements. We will go out and talk to
the people at MASE, the Mission Analysis and Systems Engineering group at the
Johnson Space Center, and find out what assumptions they and the supporting centers
have made about nuclear propulsion, what the requirements were on NERVA, and what
the requirements were on SP100, because that's the current ongoing space nuclear
system in this country. Particularly, we should learn where we are in safety, because the
safety philosophy is different from NERVA to SP100.
In the days of SP100 and the SNAP-10A system, the idea was "burnup on reentry."
People were looking at things as far-out of shooting cannons up the nozzle of NERVA to
blow it apart to ensure that it would burn up on reentry; now we are looking at "intact
reentry."
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So we decided to pull together theseworkshops (Figure 39) and to assemblea data base
on the various concepts;but we wanted to do more than just simply bring everybodyin
and go through the advocacy. We decided to put together a technologyreview panel,
which will try to evaluate these things, separatethe facts from the advocacy,and try to
get the advocatesevenlyweighed and on a level playing field. Again there is no intention
of making any decisions in terms of concepts, but rather to determine what work is
needed on each concept to bring them up to enough design maturity that we can make
intelligent decisions later on in the decade.
Next, we will work on our program and project plans. We have a draft program plan
(Figure 40 & 41) called the Thrust Plan, and we are now working on draft project plans.
Our goal is to get ready so that, depending on what money comes in in FY91, we can hit
the deck running with strategy, and statements of work, and we would have our plans in
place. We are going to do that by assembling the data bases and by holding these
workshops; and I think a key part of the process is developing advocacy charts and
papers.
Realize that we are going to have to sell this program and sell it and sell it; there are
going to be reviews on top of reviews. Immediately after the 90 day study was completed
the National Research Council (NRC) met and reviewed it, and we will have our own
internal reviews, and our own Space Systems and Technology Advisory Committee
(SSTAC). The National Research Council (NRC) has an Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board (ASEB) that will be reviewing it, and there will probably be
Congressional reviews.
So these workshops will help us, through meeting you and seeing your charts, to put
together a coherent total story on nuclear propulsion. We are going to use these
workshops to put together that data base, to help us identify the technical issues and to
help us define our program. Again, we are using the technology review panels to
evaluate the data and they will be meeting with us again in September. Then we hope
later in the fall to have a meeting with all of you give you feedback on where all of this
is going.
Just to recap, our philosophy is developing nuclear propulsion technology for spa_ze
missions and that means going into the critical subsystem and components. We are
going to look at real system performance and operating characteristics, and we are going
to look at specific space missions such as going to Mars. And we are going to have to
have a program that's environmentally acceptable, that is certainly innovative, and that is
driven by the mission requirements. It's going to be focused on critical propulsion
components, including the reactor and the rest of it. We are certainly going to have to
spend a lot of time wrestling with the philosophy on how we verify the system, and there
are a number of requirements that are going to have to met, chief among them being
safety.
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I always like the quote attributed to Glenn Seaborg(Figure 42). He said what we are
attempting to make is a flyable compact reactor, not much bigger than a desk,which
would produce the power of Hoover Dam from a cold-start in a matter of minutes. So I
alwaysthought Seaborghad that pretty well in focus.
I think there is enough in this to keep us all busy,and again I remind everybody the llth
commandmentof the nuclear community, we are not making decisions in these
workshops,so 'qqaouShalt Not SpeakIll of Another Nuclear Program." And with that,
let's go to Mars.
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THE PRESIDENT STATES THE GOAL
"Our goal: To place Americans on
Mars--and to do it within the working lifetimes
of scientists and engineers who will be recruited
for the effort today. And just as Jefferson sent
Lewis and Clark to open the continent, our
commitment to the Moon/Mars initiative will
open the Universe. It's the opportunity of a
lifetime--and offers a lifetime of opportunity."
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Figure 3
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION
ON THE SPACE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE
On February 16, 1990 Pr_lo_nt Bush approved poltcy for the Space Exploration Initiative:.
• Initiative will include both Lunar and Mars program elements,
as well as robotic science missions
• Near-term focus will be on technology development
- Sere,oh for n_ _es a_l technology
- Investme_ inhigh leveragetmtovath_lectmolo_ies w_lhpotentialIo
make a major impacton cosl. sctm_, anCor pe_
Inparallelwith mission,¢on¢_, andsystemsnaMdsstudies
• Selection of a baseline program architecture will occur after
several years of defining two or more reference architectures
while developing and demonstrating broad technologies
• NASA will be the principal implementing agency while DOD
and DOE also will have major roles in technology
development and concept definition. The National Space
Council will coordinate the development of an implementation
strategy by the three agencies
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NATIONAL SPACE POLICY - GOALS
On November 2, 1989, the President approveo a national space
policy that updates and reaffirms U.S. goals and activities in
space.
• Strengthen the security of the United States
• Obtain scientific, technological, and economic benefits
• Encourage private sector investment
• Promote international cooperative activities
° Maintain freedom of space for all activities
• Expand human presence and activity beyono Earth orbit
into the solar system
I
Figure 5
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WHY ARE WE GOING TO MARS?
To fulfill the human imperative to explore
To understand planetary evolution
To enhance our understanding of life in the universe
and find out if life once existed on Mars
To improve our country's technological competitiveness
To continue America's journey into space
I Carry out the Nahonal Space Policy goat of expanding human presenceand acttvity beyond Ea,'lh order into tl_8 solar system
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• REGENERATIVE LIFE SUPPORT 8YIITEMB
• AEROBRAKING
• ADVANCED CRYOGENIC HYDROGEN-OXYGEN
ENGINES
• SURFACE NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS
• IN SITU RESOURCE u'r1UZATION
• RADIATION PROTECTION
• NUCLEAR PROPULSION
Figure 7
EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM Oab'T
IL ., .
The Exploration Technology Program is a program through
which NASA will develop a broad set of technologies
to enable future decisions on Bnd development of
future space exploration missions. The Exploration
Technology Program is a critically-needed, focused
technology program that will strengthen the
technological foundation of the civil space program
and the nation's leadership to go forward with
ambitious future solar system exploration missions.
The Exploration Technology Program is organized Into
eight technology areas:
Space Transporatlon
In-Space Operations
Surface Operations
Human Support
Lunar end Mars Science
Information Systems
Automation
Nuclear Propulsion
16 Figure 8
EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM CYlST
The technology developed in the nuclear propulsion program
area will address multiple approaches to applying space
nuclear power systems to the improvement of mission
performance for human missions to Mars
BASIS OF THE FY 1991 BUDGET. ESTIMATE
Research will be started in nuclear thermal rocket propulsion
technologies, Including both solid core and gaseous
core nuclear system concepts, capable of long-life
and multiple starts, for future piloted mission to Mars
applications, and In nuclear electric propulsion
technologies, Including both nuclear reactor systems
technologies, advanced low-mass radiator and power
management systems, and in high-power long-life
electric thrusters for piloted missions to Mars.
Figure 9
NUCLEAR PROPULSION THRUST PLAN
I NUCLEAR PROPULSION
I
i I
NUCLEAR THERMAL ] l NUCLEAR ELECTRICPROPULSION PROPULSION
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NUCLEAR PROPULSION THRUST PLAN C_
THRUST GOALS
Develop the technologies required to apply space
nuclear propulsion systems to improve the mission
performance for human missions to Mars
Identify and develop at least one space nuclear
propulsion system that, alone or in combination
with other propulsion systems meets the
propulsion requirements for piloted and cargo
missions to Mars (Including unmanned precursor
missions) and for which technical feasibility
issues have been resolved
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RIRSA NUCLEAR PROPULSION THRUST PLAN
OBJECTIVES
Develop safe advanced nuclear propulsion
system concepts that are responsive to SEt
requirements (including vehicle/stage-cor1_iderations)
Demonstrate component, subsystem, and systems
technologies for advanced nuclear propulsion
systems
Validate design analysis techniques and develop
a technology base in the required disciplines
Figure 13
NUCLEAR PROPULSION THRUST PLAN
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PROJECT-LEVEL GOALS
e
e
Develop the nuclear thermal rocket propulsion
technologies, capable of long-life and
multiple starts, for future piloted and cargo
missions to Mars, including unmanned
precursor missions
Develop the nuclear electric propulsion
technologies, including nuclear reactor
systems technologies, advanced low-mass
radiator and power management systems,
and high-power, long-life electric thrusters
for piloted and cargo missions to Mars,
Including unmanned precursor missions
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NUCLEAR PROPULSION THRUST PLAN C_LC'T
• Develop safe, reliable, high-performance nuclear propulsion
technology for exploration of the Solar System
• Develop a consensus on the safe use of nuclear propulsion
in order to achieve public acceptance
• Strengthen and extend the propulsion technology foundation
of the civil space program so that a new, higher technology
plateau will be established for future propulsion programs
• Broaden participation of universities to enhance the
scientific and technical educational level of the U. S.
• Coordinate with DOE, DoD and their labs and contractors to
minimize duplication and maximize use of existing resources
• Implement through a joint NASAJDOFJDoDIIndustry/University
team approach
• Carry out a phased and focused technology development
program with clearly defined technical objectives in order
to identity early the best approach(es)
• Maintain a flexible design approach to accommodate changes
I
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IMLEO SENSITIVITY TO LAUNCH OPPORTUNITY
MARS EXPEDITION CASE
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PROPULSION PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
NEP, SEP, AND SCR PILOTED MARS MISSION
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PROPULSION PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
SCR AND GCR PILOTED MARS MISSIONS, QUICK TRIPS
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NTR MARS PERFORMANCE
THRUST/WEIGHT AND ISP VARIATIONS
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Versatility
Basic Propulsion
Module
Lunar Direct &
Unmanned Deep Space
Manned Mars Flyby
Manned Mars Landing
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NERVA TECHNOLOGY HAS SYNERGISTIC APPLICATIONS
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F.g_
Nuclear Rocket Program
I
Figure 25
Evolution of Rover Reactors
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NERVA Flight Engine Configuration
Figure 27
MODES OF NUCLEAR ENGINE OPERATION I
Hot Bleed Cycle
\
Cold Bleed Cycle
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NERVA/Rover Reactor System Test Sequence
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Figure 29
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PARTICLE BED REACTOR DESIGN
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Figure 31
LIQUID ANNULAR REACTOR SYSTEM
1. MOLTENFUEL CONTAINEDIN ITS OWN HAI_A.L
2. LAiR STAmUT'I:9 BY C/NIlqIPETAL FORCE.
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NUCLEAR PROPULSION THRUST PLAN O_LC'T
5.3 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY_
1990
PHASE 1
GCR - 1
GCR - 2
SCR- 1
SCR - 2
NEP - 1 (CV)
1995 2000 2005
PHASE 2 PHASE 3
NEP - 2 (CY) _X
NEP - 1 (PIIotm/) _
/
NEP - 2 (Piloted)/
(CONCEPT/COMPONENT) (_
NTP
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NUCLEAR PROPULSION THRUST PLAN (_LcT
...... m
KEY TECHNICAL ISSUES
Safetylsafaguards/QA
(during all program phases)
QualificatiofVacceptance test strat.
Reliability and fault tolerance
High Performance engines
(including reactors)
Reusability/restart capability
Reactor Fuel
Structural Aspects
Turbomachinery
Vessels/Nozzles
Pumps/Valves
Diagnostic Capability
Control Systems (neutronics/
I&C)
Power Processing Units
(NEP)
Thrusters (NEP)
Space operations
- radiation shielding
- design criteria for in-space
operation and
maintenance
Propellants/Prop. handling
Thermal hydraulics
Thermal Management
Materials
Lifetime
Mass/Volume Limitations
In-situ Prop. Utilization
W
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NUCLEAR PROPULSION THRUST PLAN
. .2 CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT SCOP
GAS CORE ROCKETS SOLID CORE ROCKETS NEP
Reactor type Reactor type
Heat trenspoN and rejection Heat transport and rejection
Safety System Safety systems
RedlaUon Shielding Radiation shielding
Control Control
Pressure vessel Pressure vessel
Turbopumpa Turbopumps
Nozzle Nozzle
ThnJst Structure Thrust structure
Reactor type
Heat transport and
rejection
Power conversion
unit
Sa/ety s_Jtema
RmdlMIon shielding
Control
Pressure vessel
Turbopumps
Power processing
un_ (PPU)
Thrusters
Thrust structure
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EXPLORAlION TECHNOLOOY PROGRAM OaST
I_r ........ ,,. "It
WHAT NEEDI TO Ill DONE IN FY 1990
• ASSEMBLE "REQUIREMENTS"
- Mission 8tudy Assumptions (workshop)
. NERVA Requiremunts
- SP-10O Requirements (especially satety)
• ASSEMBLE DATA BASE ON CONCEPTS
- Workshops on GCR, SCR and NEP
. Publish report (data base)
• DEVELOP PROGRAM AND PROJECT PLANS
- Prepare SOW for Contracts
- Prepare procurement packages
Figure 37
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NUCLEAR PROPULSION OqE'r
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[ Ob_cthm: I De.top the FY 1991 program,Including
I
- IXOCummm mtegy
- mmmmenm of work
- tlmmUpmJect plans
[Implementation: I Ammmble data base
Hold Workshop(s)
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OlrTNUCLEAR PROPULSION
im
DJ IULt  
• Amble Mrs Iteee
• Mentlfy teohnleel lemJee
• Provide Input for FY 1N1 eh_dleo
• Hold workshop covering
- Mission studies
- Safety
GCR/SCPJNEP
• Collect data and Im_ technical
"tiger team" evaluate data
• Issue evaluated data report and workshop
summary
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Nuclear "-'' 'ropunsuonThrust
NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM PHILOSOPHY
Oblective:
• The development of nuclear propulsion system technology
for space missions
• The development of critical subsystem and component technology
• Evaluation of real system performance and operating characteristics
• The evolution of a propulsion system concept that will meet the
objectives of specific space missions when firm objectives are
Identified
• The development of a sound technical system verification approach
which is environmentally and programmatically acceptable
• Pursuit of Innovative and advanced technologies with significant
mission advantages
IN SUMMARY, A MISSION/REQUIREMENTS DRIVEN ITECHNOLOGY PROGRAM IS PLANNED
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Nuclear Propulsion Thrust O4ET
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NUCLEAR PROPULSION DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY
Principal thrust directed to the development of critical propulsion
components and subsystems that significantly affect propulsion
system characteristics:
• Reactor subsystem
• Thrusters (for NEP)
• Nozzle (for NTP)
• Turbopump assembly (for NTP)
• Thrust vector control system (for NTP)
• Power system (for NTP)
• Power processor (for NEP)
• Control system
Development of a verification approach that includes components,
subsystems and systems, and addresses:
• Analysis
• Simulation
• Test
Requirements priority in order:
• High reliability and ground/flight safety
• Development cost/risk
• Performance/Weight
• Remote maintenance (robotics)
Figure 41
What we are attempting to make
is a flyable compact reactor,
not much bigger than an office
desk, that will produce the
power of Hoover Dam from a
cold start in a matter of minutes
- Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
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